The Limitations of Hegel’s Argument for Asymmetric Reciprocity in Ethical Marriage

In Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues that Kant accurately captured that the moral standpoint is purely formal, but that this means it is entirely subjective and therefore in conflict with objective good and destined to devolve into evil. However, Kant portrays the moral standpoint as the standpoint of freedom so Hegel argues that we cannot abandon the moral standpoint on the basis of its conflict with objective good because this is to abandon freedom. Instead, Hegel argues that we must resolve this conflict by finding a way to unify the subjective freedom of the moral standpoint and the objectivity of the good and he calls this higher unity “ethical life” (§141). If ethical life is the unity of subjective freedom and the objective good, Hegel must provide both a substantive system of duties and an account of their actuality in social practice. Hegel therefore argues for the necessity of specific ethical practices to develop the concrete content of duty which he accuses Kantian morality of lacking. The moral standpoint is subjective self-certainty, but ethical life needs objective good: the knowledge of an authority above my own subjective particularity. However, this objective authority cannot be separate from my subjectivity but rather must be understood as an actuality of my subjectivity (§146). Hegel does not argue that ethical life is some objective standard imposed upon my recognition, but that this objective authority is instead something I see myself in and therefore ethical life is the proper form of recognition which Hegel calls universal self-consciousness (§147). Therefore, Hegel argues that to achieve full self-consciousness or proper recognition, I must engage in actual ethical practices and by providing an account of the necessity of these actual practices, beginning with marriage, Hegel establishes and articulates substantive duties. 

Since ethical life is the actuality of my subjectivity in the moral standpoint which is the standpoint of freedom, ethical life is the actuality of my freedom. Hegel argues that by following ethical customs, we free ourselves from both arbitrary natural desires and the emptiness of strictly formal moral considerations and therefore actualize our freedom (§149). Hegel argues that the actuality of ethical life is seen in the individual as virtue, but that virtue cannot be understood outside of the fulfillment of concrete social practices. In a proper ethical society, one needs only to adhere to the prescribed duties of the society to be virtuous (§150). On the basis that my virtue and the actualization of my freedom are contingent upon my performance of societal duties in actual practice, Hegel argues for his concept of marriage which he describes as immediate ethical life.

For Hegel, love is a form of recognition. When I unify myself with another individual through love, I experience a freedom from my particularity and so conceive of my universality. Love is a feeling and is in this sense immediate. Hegel describes this feeling as “ethical life in its natural form” and says love has two moments (§158A). The first moment presents a contradiction in that love makes us lose our will to be independent as we feel incomplete without the other. The second moment resolves this contradiction because we find ourselves in the other and they find themself in us. In love, I both lose my individuality and find my individuality. Hegel argues that this contradiction is resolved by the idea that love is an “ethical unity” with another which transforms my natural individuality (§158 AD). 

Hegel presents three misconceptions of what marriage is: naturalism, contractualism, and romanticism. Naturalism is problematic in that it considers marriage as only for sexual reproduction and thus excludes love. Contractualism is flawed because it makes marriage a mere agreement and thus is an arbitrary relation between two individuals. Hegel accuses Kant of presenting a purely contractual and thus inaccurate concept of marriage. According to Hegel, marriage has to be in some sense contractual because it must be the result of two separate and particular individuals voluntarily coming to an agreement. However, marriage cannot be purely contractual as the pure contract keeps the individuals separate whereas marriage must constitute a unity of two into one (§161A). However, pure romanticism is also wrong because it reduces marriage to the feeling of love but the unity into one substance that marriage requires cannot be concretely accomplished on the basis of pure feeling as this feeling is passable. While marriage requires love, it also requires that the two affirm their love in a social context. Crucial to Hegel’s concept of marriage is that the loss of individuality in the unity of the two frees the individuals from their arbitrary natural desires in what he calls the “transformation of desire” (§163). This cannot fully occur unless the two make a public commitment to one another in the context of a social ceremony. Hegel conceptualizes this unity as the two becoming a single substance or person and describes husband and wife as its accidents (§163). Therefore, for Hegel, marriage is not purely natural, contractual, or romantic but is necessarily, in some sense, all three and constitutes an “ethical duty” (§162). 

For Hegel, the idea that two people become one requires that the two play different roles in a relationship of asymmetric reciprocity. Hegel argues that the man plays an active role while the woman plays a passive role which he derives from an idea about the biological difference between men and women. According to Hegel, this natural asymmetry translates to ethical life and becomes rational as men and women have different forms of self-consciousness in marriage (§165). The man has a universal self consciousness which is characterized by thought and rationality. His agency is in working, researching, and participating in politics. Insofar as his agency comes from being productive outside of the home, the man plays an active role in the marriage and is the leader of the household and family unit. The woman, however, has a self consciousness which is instead particular and finds its substantial unity in feeling not thought. She is passive in that her agency is within the household and mainly reproductive (§166). Hegel argues that women are incapable of learning “higher sciences” which involve universals and for this reason women are unfit to participate in politics or work outside the home (§166A). Because the man works, Hegel argues that men ought to have legal control over the family’s property and be the family’s representative (§171). This asymmetry is important to Hegel because it is the unity of a universal with a particular that constitutes the singularity of the married couple as an individual person or substance. 

While Hegel’s description of marriage accurately reflects the asymmetrical relationship between husband and wife of the actual institution of marriage of his time, there are problems with Hegel’s argument that this is how it ought to be in ethical life. Hegel’s entire development of ethical life is an attempt to resolve a conflict between the subjectivity of the moral standpoint and the objectivity of the good through the formation of a higher unity. Ethical life is thus the unity of the objective with the subjective or the universal with the particular. It therefore makes sense why marriage, as ethical life in practice, would be conceived of by Hegel as involving a unity between some universal component and some particular component. Furthermore, insofar as marriage is the unity of two individuals into one, it makes sense why he might consider one of the constituent individuals to be the universal component and the other the particular. While it may reasonably follow from Hegel’s dialectical reflection that the practical social institution of marriage, if it is to reflect the structure of the ethical life, has to be a kind of unity between objectivity and subjectivity, a universal and particular, and thus an active and passive part, his arguments for why the active part is constituted by the husband and the passive part is constituted by the wife are deeply flawed and it is here where his argument ought to be resisted. 

Hegel gets the idea of men being active and women being passive from his Philosophy of Nature and argues that the biological difference between men and women is an active/passive one. Hegel then translates this “natural” difference to the realm of ethical life. However, this claim about biology appears to be incorrect as it is unclear that such an active/passive sexual dichotomy exists. It is therefore unreasonable to derive claims about what ought to be the social roles of men and women on the basis of incorrect claims about biology. Furthermore, even if we are to accept that there really is this kind of biological asymmetry between men and women, it is unclear why Hegel feels he can translate this difference to the ethical and intellectual realms. Wollstonecraft argues that even if there are biological differences between men and women, this does not mean “there is sex in souls” (Wollstonecraft, 35). 

Even if we further accept that there is such a biological difference, and that this difference can be translated into practical social life, so it is true that men play an active role in marriage and women play a passive role, Hegel does not provide compelling arguments for why these active and passive roles ought to take the shape that he describes. One argument he gives for why the passive role of women involves not working is that women cannot learn higher sciences because these sciences involve a universal element and women, because women are biologically and therefore intellectually passive and unify their self-consciousness in feeling and not thinking, lack the rationality needed to engage with these universal elements. Wollstonecraft argues that we must understand “right” and “duty” by examining human nature and that such an examination reveals that human nature is to reason (Wollstonecraft, 12). Sentience, for both men and women, serves the purpose of allowing us to engage in rational activity. On Wollstonecraft’s account, women, because they are human and experience sentience, have, by nature, the ability to reason and therefore to grasp the “universals” contained within higher science. Furthermore, if we are to, as Wollstonecraft says, derive “right” and “duty” from human nature, and the nature of women (and all humans) is to reason and think, then the “duty” of women cannot be to enter into a position wherein they do not exercise agency in the form of rational activity as the Hegelian system would have it.

Simone Beauvoir in The Second Sex, argues that Hegel’s master-slave dialectic might better represent the historical asymmetrical relationship between men and women in marriage that Hegel’s concept of marriage seems to reflect as men are in a position of power and value freedom and rationality like the master and women are trapped in the home as child bearers and in this sense choose life over freedom like the slave. Clara Zetkin in “The Liberation of Women” follows a similar line of thinking and argues that women are condemned “to political and social slavery through economic dependence” and the only way to free women from this slavery is for them to work (Zetkin, 46). Wollstonecraft similarly describes such marriage as condemning women to “perpetual childhood” (Wollstonecraft, 46). If for Hegel, women are supposed to enter into marriage to fully realize their freedom, it does not make sense that this full realization of freedom of ethical life will take the form of a kind of slavery. While Hegel allows for divorce to ensure marriage is consensual, Beauvoir argues that “divorce is only an abstract possibility for the wife, if she does not have the means to earn her own living,” and, since Hegel’s system does not allow women to work for their own money, women are trapped marriage (Beauvoir, 107). The objections of Beauvoir, Zetkin and Wollstonecraft suggest that the proper realization of freedom, if it is to happen in the context of marriage, ought to take the shape of equality between husband and wife. 

Hegel makes a compelling argument that to unify the subjectivity of the moral standpoint with the objective good, we need social institutions and actual practices which represent objective authority but which I can at the same time identify with and see myself in as they are not a limit to my subjectivity, but an actualization of my subjectivity. Furthermore, Hegel makes a compelling argument for why love is a transformation of individuality into a unity made concrete by the social institution of marriage and that, because marriage actualizes my freedom and constitutes proper recognition and full self-consciousness, marriage is a necessary institution in ethical life. Where Hegel’s argument ought to be resisted is in the idea that marriage necessitates that one member of the married couple be subordinated to the other in a relation of asymmetric reciprocity. It may reasonably follow from Hegel’s system that marriage, if it is an ethical unity, must somehow unite a universal and a particular component. Where his argument falls apart is in claiming that these components are the individuals in the marriage. I would argue that Hegel’s claim about the metaphysical structure of ethical unity leaves room for the possibility that the universal and particular parts of marriage are not constituted by the individuals and instead can be accounted for in some other way. Furthermore, even if the universal and particular components are constituted by the individuals, Hegel’s arguments for why the male is the active component and why the female is the passive and furthermore why this activity and passivity ought to take the shape that he describes in practical social life are objectionable in that they are grounded in falsifiable claims about biology. Finally, there is a glaring inconsistency in the way in which Hegel argues that marriage constitutes the actualization of freedom but arrives at a system wherein women are left in a position resembling slavery. While Hegel presents compelling ideas regarding the importance of love in the realization of self consciousness and the importance of marriage as a necessary union in ethical life, he fails to properly support his argument that marriage requires asymmetric reciprocity in the form of women taking a subordinate role to men.

Works Cited

Beauvoir, Simone de. The Second Sex. Vintage Classics, 2011.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge University 

Press, 1991. 

Wollstonecraft, Mary. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Z & L Barnes, 2022. 

Zetkin, Clara. “For the Liberation of Women!” Clara Zetkin Selected Writings, Haymarket 

Books, 2015.